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Introduction 
 
Is public policy ethics possible and, if so, is it desirable? This twofold question can – 
and sometimes does — elicit a smile or a frown. The smile implies that ethical theorizing 
rests on a naïve idea of policy-making; the frown implies that there is something tasteless or 
incongruous in expecting philosophy to engage with problems of policy and with the political 
bargaining and compromise that policy-making often involves.1 These reactions – familiar to 
many working in this academic discipline – point to the ways in which ethics and public 
policy have been taken to be separate areas of practical concern and theoretical inquiry.   
For some philosophers, the very idea of public policy ethics rests on a category 
mistake, confusing proper reflection on moral ideals with thinking about what is practically 
feasible. Gerald Gaus’ qualms that “participation in public controversy masked as philosophy 
corrupts philosophy” captures this worry well, reflecting the anxiety that “a sophisticated, 
rational, ideological advocacy is conducted as if it were philosophy, giving the impression 
(both to ourselves and our students) that philosophy is merely an intellectual game in which 
you defend what you want to believe” (Gaus 2005: 67). Public policy ethics, on this account, 
diverts the moral philosopher from doing philosophically relevant work and downgrades 
ethical theorizing to the level of wishy-washy opinion and rhetorical hot-air.2 The worry, of 
course, is that the only way for philosophers to gain the ear of policy-makers is to betray the 
commitment to the reasoned evaluation of abstract arguments that defines philosophical 
ethics in the first place. In short, public policy ethics is no ethics at all — or so the argument 
for policy-free ethics implies.  
Other philosophers occasionally point to the fact that the rubber of ethical theory 
never quite meets the road of policy. The contention here is that proper ethical reflection 
rarely plays more than a minor or decorative role in the actual policy-making process. One of 
the reasons for this alleged disconnect between ethics and public policy is that moral 
philosophy is not the kind of material that typically matters for policy work. Jonathan Wolff 
(2011) comes close to this position when he notes that it is not so much the philosophical 
quality of an argument that informs policy as the philosopher’s ability to play the language 
game of the policy status quo.3 Wolff notes that “it is very rare for a policy to have been 
introduced for clear and principled reasons”, which means that “to have any effect on 
immediate policy, philosophers will have to swallow hard and accept that the discussion will 
 
 
 
often have to take place within the terms and space set by political and pragmatic concerns” 
(80). Following this reading, rigorous ethical theorizing as currently practiced often fails to 
capture the real concerns of actual policy-makers, thus raising the spectre of irrelevance for 
public policy ethics as a distinct discipline. 
Public policy experts have their own versions of these concerns. After all, if policy 
analysis is a scientific pursuit, with its own standards for success, philosophical analysis will 
seem at best like unnecessary hand-waving, and at worst, like a distraction from the work to 
be done. This might explain why, as Henry Shue remarked, (2006: 709) experts in public 
policy often treat “specialists on ethics or normative issues” as unfortunate additions to the 
main event, “like the wilted salad that comes whether requested or not” with one’s meal, or as 
matters of taste, to be taken or left, “like the pepper that is entirely optional".  Worse still, 
philosophy can sometimes seem like a threat to public policy, encouraging us to focus on the 
desirable rather than the practicable, and, in a famous phrase, making ‘the perfect the enemy 
of the good’. Hence, students are encouraged carefully to distinguish policy analysis — 
which is about “learning why governments do what they do and what the consequences of 
their actions are” through “the tools of systematic inquiry” — with policy advocacy, which is 
about “saying what governments ought to do” using “the skills of rhetoric, persuasion, 
organization and activism” (Dye 1981: 6-7). Since, by definition, ethics deals with oughts, 
this widely taught view of public policy tends to equate policy ethics with the promotion of 
partisan agendas and ideological advocacy. Thus, those working in ethics and public policy 
can feel like an unloved child, disparaged and disowned by its parents.  
 Other familiar concerns with public policy ethics reflect the fact that public policy is 
a political activity, and espouse the belief that politics is fundamentally amoral. Such a 
separation of ethics and policy draws on familiar images of politicians and public officials as 
Machiavellian creatures, who must be willing to set their moral scruples aside, and to ‘dirty 
their hands’, climbing ‘the greasy pole’ of power, in order to achieve their objectives. 
Couched in the language of Weber, rather than Machiavelli, good politicians and apt public 
officials must be concerned with the choice of means to given ends, and not with the 
evaluation of ends.  It is not for them to "turn the other cheek", nor to pursue the “ethics of 
conviction”4, however permissible, even admirable, such behaviour may be in private life.  
Now, if politics were really amoral, there would be little point in examining the moral 
principles that should guide it, however enjoyable it might be to play a parlour game called 
‘imagining the good polity’ or ‘choosing principles of social justice’. Some moralists might 
relish arguing amongst themselves about where, how far and why our actual world departs 
 
 
 
from the ideal. But were politics and, with it, policy-making, reducible to a scramble for 
power and influence, it is hard to see why most people should interest themselves in ethical 
arguments about policy. Perhaps morality might have a place in private life – or those spaces 
for personal choice and action that happen to be free from political struggles – but to suppose 
that public policy might be subject to ethical reflection, choice and control, would seem 
delusional, at best, manipulative and deceptive at worst. 
 However, many people reject such amoral views of politics as incoherent and 
reductive, and accept that a normative approach to politics can be helpful, and even desirable.  
Thus, there has been a veritable explosion in normative political philosophy since the 1970s  
and the pathbreaking work of analytic political philosophers, such as John Rawls, Robert 
Nozick, Ronald Dworkin, of critical theorists, such as Jürgen Habermas and Axel Honneth 
and feminist philosophers, such as Iris Marion Young, Nancy Fraser and Anne Phillips.5 Yet, 
until recently, this explosion had produced no systematic interest in ethics and public policy. 
Indeed, it is only very recently that a debate has started to take place on the distinctive 
methods, if any, of ethics and public policy, and the different approaches, styles or ways in 
which it might be developed. However, to date, there is no collective publication — 
handbook or otherwise — on the current state of the discipline.6   
 It is not that moral, political or legal philosophers do not engage in ethical discussions 
of public policy, or that they are never asked to participate in public inquiries on matters of 
controversy. On the contrary, we can think of the contributions of Bernard Williams on 
obscenity, Mary Warnock and Onora O’Neill on bioethics, Salvatore Veca on ‘Feeding the 
Planet’, or the contributions of Jürgen Habermas, Ronald Dworkin, Charles Taylor and 
Amartya Sen to see that philosophers play an important public role. 7 Indeed, several 
contributors to this volume have been involved in public commissions, or in policy-making 
bodies concerned with public health, education and security. Nonetheless, the dominant 
approach to ethics and public policy, until recently, has often seemed to be more concerned 
with ‘sex, drugs, and rock and roll’, than with the ethics of public policy as most politicians, 
policy-makers, civil servants and citizens understand or experience it. Thus, publications and 
teaching on ethics and public policy would often centre on popular controversy around 
prostitution, abortion, homosexuality, euthanasia, recreational drug use, pornography and 
“hate speech” – all seen, correctly, as meriting normative attention, but treated as though they 
had nothing much to do with more mundane and less contentious issues.  
 Interesting and important though such discussions have been, for philosophers as for 
other people, this traditional approach to ethics and public policy suffers from two problems. 
 
 
 
The first is that a focus on the more sensational issues reinforces the idea that ‘ordinary’ 
matters of policy raise no interesting or complex ethical questions in themselves, and none 
that need affect our approach abortion, euthanasia, or free speech. But as feminists, and 
disability-activists have insisted, we cannot easily separate the assumptions about the value of 
life, or the best way to distinguish public and private matters when it comes to the regulation 
of sexuality or speech from those that shape our practices of security, healthcare, education 
and transport.8 In addition, a focus on ‘sexy’ topics plays into an idea of public ethics as 
merely an extension, or application of, familiar moral theories, whether consequentialist or 
not, rather than as a subject which may lead us to rethink our moral categories, conceptual 
distinctions and normative approaches.  
Our collection, therefore, adopts a perspective on ethics and public policy which is at 
once broader, and narrower, than is usual. It is broader, because we wanted to bring together 
work on the ethical dimensions of public policy spanning issues of domestic and international 
politics, intergenerational politics and such ordinary or technical, but nonetheless central, 
topics as the siting of nuclear waste, the ethics of taxation, policies on disability and poverty. 
Ideally, we would have loved to have had chapters examining the ethical dimensions of every 
policy issue as instantiated in current governmental practice – but that, of course, would have 
been overwhelming, as well as impossible. So, instead, we tried to focus our attention on the 
breadth of work that is now being done in ethics and public policy in order to highlight the 
range and quality of research in the area, and to illuminate the ethical dimensions of public 
policy that many of us – the editors included – have never considered and have no idea how 
to handle.   
Nevertheless, if our collection is very much broader in its conception of ethics and 
public policy than is usual, it is narrower in its focus on one important dimension.  Following 
theorists such as Dennis Thompson, Jonathan Wolff, and Richard Bellamy, we take the 
political dimensions of policy-making to play an important role in determining the ethical 
content, dynamics and the types of justification that can be offered for public policy. 9 
Moreover, because that content, and those justifications will depend on whether or not we 
think of people as political equals, and on the forms of freedom, wellbeing and opportunity 
which that equality requires, permits or forbids, we focus explicitly on issues of ethics and 
public policy that arise as a result of democratic political struggles and ideals, and that can be 
resolved domestically and internationally in ways consistent with democratic government.  
 It is not that undemocratic governments are of no interest to us, nor that they cannot 
improve our understanding of morality and politics. Given that our democratic societies are 
 
 
 
imperfect in many ways, as is our understanding of democratic values and institutions, it 
would be absurd to cut ourselves off from potential sources of knowledge based on current 
ideas about what is and is not democratic. However, for practical and for philosophical 
reasons, we believe it best to centre this collection on problems of ethics and public policy 
that arise in democracies, and on democratically informed or democratically sensitive 
principles, broadly conceived. Practically, we hope that this will give our collection a 
substantive coherence and a methodological focus that it might otherwise lack, given the 
breadth of its subject-matter. We also hope that it might provide some consistency of factual 
and normative assumptions across chapters dealing with very different moral and political 
problems.  
Philosophically, this selection on the basis of democratic considerations reflects our 
conviction that ethics and public policy can no more adopt ‘the view from nowhere’ than 
other branches of philosophy, but need not therefore be limited to the presentation and 
evaluation of ‘the way we do things around here’, to borrow a famous phrase of Richard 
Rorty.10 Instead, we hope that combining the ethical evaluation of policy with democratic 
theory and practice, quite broadly understood, will enable our collection to speak to all those 
for whom the right to participate in the government of one’s society is an essential right, and 
a defeasible constraint on the legitimacy of any government.11  
Democracies are quite varied political arrangements, and the adjective ‘democratic’ 
can be applied to associations, individuals, institutions and ideals. Nonetheless, democratic 
governments are committed to the belief that all citizens are, in principle, entitled to 
participate in government, and this makes democracies different from other forms of 
government, on which wealth, virtue, sex, lineage, religion or parentage are thought to justify 
limiting political participation to a few, select, individuals.  Importantly, for our purposes, it 
means that democracies cannot evaluate public policies purely on the assumption that citizens 
are the subjects of government, or the objects of government policy.  In addition – and this is 
a distinctive implication of democratic government – ethical evaluation has to consider the 
effects of policy on citizens as governors, or potential governors, of their society and, 
therefore, the consequences of policy on people’s ability to see themselves as active 
participants in government rather than passive beneficiaries of public policy. 12  Hence, 
democracies must find ways of selecting people for positions of power and influence that 
reflect democratic ideas about political ends and means, as opposed to theocratic, aristocratic, 
plutocratic or epistocratic ones.  
 
 
 
Consequently, the ethics of public policy in a democratic society involves meeting at 
least two important constraints that other societies might avoid. The first is that, in its design 
and implementation, public policy must reflect "equal respect and concern" for citizen’s 
wellbeing and rights, to borrow Ronald Dworkin's fortunate phrase.13 The second is that it 
must also protect and foster people’s capacities to share in the process of governing, however 
that process is conceived. Hence, as this collection shows, while democratic government 
comes in many forms, reflecting different political ideals, circumstances and needs, the 
differences between democratic and undemocratic government provide a fruitful lens for 
envisaging the ethics of public policy and may, on occasion, be necessary, not merely useful. 
Our aim is not to replace the currently contending moralities of utility, liberal rights, 
republican virtue, contractualist counterfactuals or care relationships with a distinct (and 
presumably preferable) democratic ethics. Rather, we seek to show that it can be morally 
illuminating and politically helpful to understand the constraints that democracy places on 
public ethics, whether or not those constraints differ markedly from those suggested by 
alternative ethical perspectives. To put it in slightly more technical terms, we aim to 
investigate how democratic values, conceived as pro tanto or prima facie reasons for 
government action, might inform ethical reflection on public policy, bearing in mind that they 
may have little or no distinctive significance in some cases. 
 
There is no one favoured view of democracy that unites the 41 chapters of this 
Handbook. Authors were not asked to take a particular "line", and they were selected, as far 
as possible, not just for their obvious expertise, but also to reflect the geographical, 
professional, and personal variety of scholars working in the field. Collections of this sort 
tend to be dominated by scholars who are already well known. However, much new work in 
ethics and public policy is being done by relatively young scholars, for whom public ethics is 
central to their academic work, rather than being of sporadic interest, or an outgrowth of the 
more traditional philosophical concerns with which they are principally occupied. Thus, 
while the chapters in each section complement each other and, we hope, provide an 
accessible and enjoyable introduction to recent work in ethics and public policy, they are 
written in different styles, draw on the experience of different countries, and the ideas of 
different thinkers. Their effect is panoramic, as well as synthetic, in ways that defy simple 
summary. 
Our refusal to commit to a specific view of democracy should hardly come as a 
surprise, given the extent of philosophical and political controversy about the nature and 
 
 
 
value of democracy.  Even when different authors agree in their general normative positions 
about what democracy is or ought to be, they nonetheless end up disagreeing on the exact 
implications that these positions have for particular public policies. Some of these 
disagreements emerge, we think, as a natural consequence of what Rawls calls the “burdens 
of judgment” (Rawls 1971; 2001)14 , an expression meant to capture the difficulties we 
confront in prioritizing competing moral values and principles, the hard selection and 
weighing of complex evidential matters or decisions about the least implausible instantiations 
of vague normative concepts. But disagreements will also arise because of the substantive 
variations across distinct policy areas and issues, even in cases where those areas and issues 
are contiguous or otherwise connected. As many of the chapters in this Handbook show, 
democratic commitments play out differently in different areas of policy - for example, in the 
area of warfare as compared to the field of foreign policy, and democracy does not direct us 
to the same kind of decisions in the domain of waste disposal policies as it does when it 
comes to matters of climate change.15 Hence, our Handbook comprises different perspectives 
on democracy, as well as different facets of public policy.   
The absence of a unifying democratic view is furthermore motivated by theoretical 
considerations pertaining to the conceptual structure of democracy. Since the publication of 
Kenneth Arrow’s Social Choice and Individual Values in 1951, a rich literature has 
demonstrated the logical impossibility for any decision-making system to be simultaneously 
fully inclusive and pluralistic, respectful of majoritarian preferences, and collectively 
rational, although these are all democratic values, which we may want our institutions to 
realise.16 We have therefore encouraged our authors to focus on those democratic desiderata 
(if any) that seem most pertinent to the policy areas with which they are concerned. The 
result is a sequencing of the chapters that is meant to provide a helpful introduction to 
contemporary ethics and public policy, rather than tell a particular story about democracy.    
Section 1 is dedicated to questions of methodology. It explores what it means to do 
public policy ethics today, raises questions about the contours and content of public policy 
ethics as a distinctive discipline, examines the ethical dimensions of cognate disciplines such 
as policy analysis and the place of policy ethics in the wider landscape of ethical theorizing, 
and considers contrasting approaches to the place and role of philosophers in the public 
policy process, and the public arena more generally.  
 Sections 2, 3 and 4 cover various substantive areas of public policy. The sections 
mirror a quasi-historical sequence in the theory and practice of public policy, starting from 
the basic idea that the public policy domain consists in whatever governments happen to be 
 
 
 
doing at any particular moment17, while at the same time reflecting the changes in democratic 
policies and modes of government since the Second World War.18 Drawing on an analogy 
with Ian Hacking’s notion of “styles of reasoning”, one could see these three sections of the 
Handbook as instantiating different styles of governing. For Hacking, it is characteristic of 
styles of reasoning that they “introduce new ways of being a candidate for truth and for 
falsehood” (Hacking 1994: 42). Similarly, we take a style of governing to establish new 
dimensions whereby practical subject-matters become matters of policy concern. Though 
styles of governing can change the substance or scope of various policy areas, styles are also 
about different ways of doing government that underlie, define, control or revise what are 
considered to be the proper bounds and inner dynamic of the public policy domain.  
Section 2 corresponds to a vision of government centred on the state’s de jure 
monopolising of some basic domestic functions, such as the organisation of domestic 
security, criminal justice and education, the mediation of economic interests and regulation of 
finance as well as of military security in the international realm. Intuitively, these are policy 
areas which seem inseparable from the contemporary idea of government, the sine qua non of 
public policy.  
Section 3 is concerned with a more expansive conception of government than the first, 
taking us from a mode of government tightly associated with the pouvoirs régaliens, as the 
French helpfully describe them, to a vision of government as a privileged agent for securing 
the wellbeing of individuals, no matter the ascriptive and voluntary associations to which 
they otherwise belong. Government has a duty to prevent poverty and to help the poor but, 
beyond that, it has the responsibility to dismantle those social distinctions which keep people 
‘in their place’, and make government the preserve of a privileged elite. Thus, the chapters in 
this third section are concerned with a mode of governing, as much as the content of actual 
policies – a mode which assumes that government has a special duty to foster social solidarity 
and inclusion, and to enable people to have an active say – for instance, via electoral 
participation – in the way that they are governed.  
Section 4 brings together a group of public policies concerned both with existential 
issues and questions of identity which, until recently, would have seemed to be the preserve 
of individuals, or of Churches and other secondary associations, rather than of government, in 
so far as they were seen as subject to control at all. Thus, some of the policies in this section 
are concerned with the future existence, quality of life, and sustainability of future citizens, as 
instantiated in the chapters on intergenerational justice, youth policies, new reproductive 
technologies, behavioural nudges, climate change, and waste policies. Others are concerned 
 
 
 
with the responsibilities of government, faced with the inevitable, albeit often unintended, 
effects of government on the civic and cultural identities of citizens, and on the social 
standing and respect for minority ethnic, racial and religious groups.  The chapters on 
citizenship tests, family reunification programs, language policies and policies on religious 
diversity and accommodation reflect this strand of contemporary public policy, with its 
concern for the nature and identity of citizens, and with the existential choices and threats that 
they face.  
We hope that this sequencing of chapters will make the Handbook easier for readers, 
be they practitioners, academics, students, or simply citizens interested in particular policies.  
The three sections are not meant to deploy a precise historical narrative – which would in any 
case be impossible given the different political trajectories of contemporary democracies – 
and some chapters could fit in more than one section. For instance, the chapter on education 
could have been included in Section 2, the chapter on privacy and surveillance or the chapter 
on death policies in Section 3, and the chapter on language policies or the one on religious 
accommodations could have been inserted in Section 1. However, we hope that this ordering 
of the 41 chapters that make up this Handbook will benefit readers, and facilitate future 
scholarly debate.19  
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1 This is the position underlying much of the political realism about foreign policy defended by E.H. Carr or 
Hans Morgenthau. For an analysis of and reply to political realism, see Coady (2008). 
2 The tenet that practical ethics (and, with it, public policy ethics) is not philosophy proper can be traced back to 
Bertrand Russell, who equates it with preaching. In a 1944 text where he defends his emotivist meta-ethics 
against Buchler's critique, Russell writes that “persuasion in ethical questions is necessarily different from 
persuasion in scientific matters. According to me, the person who judges that A is good is wishing others to feel 
certain desires. He will therefore, if not hindered by other activities, try to rouse these desires in other people if 
he thinks he knows how to do so. This is the purpose of preaching, and it was my purpose in the various books 
in which I have expressed ethical opinions.”, in Russell (1999: 149). 
3 Wolff (2011) does not believe that the gap between philosophy and politics makes public policy ethics non-
sensical or pointless, as both his book and his chapter in this collection reveal. 
4 Weber himself is more nuanced when he reflects on the relation between the "ethics of conviction" (which 
focuses on the morality of ends) and the "ethics of responsibility" (which concentrates on the morality of 
effective ends). In Politics as a Vocation he finds it "immeasurably moving when a mature human being (...) 
who feels the responsibility he bears for the consequences of his own actions with his entire soul and who acts 
in harmony with an ethics of responsibility reaches the point where he says, "Here I stand, I can do no other." 
That is authentically human and cannot fail to move us. For this is a situation that may befall any of us at some 
point, if we are not inwardly dead. In this sense an ethics of conviction and an ethics of responsibility are not 
absolute antitheses but are mutually complementary, and only when taken together do they constitute the 
authentic human being who is capable of having a "vocation for politics".", in Weber (2004: 92).  
5 For an interesting attempt at carving out a sui generis moral space for public policy and political activity, see 
also Palumbo & Bellamy (2010).  
6 There are, to be sure, quite a few public policy analysis handbooks, like the ones edited by Moran, Rein, and 
Goodin (2006), Peters & Pierre (2006), or Fischer, Miller, and Sidney (2007). Add to this the existence of a 
handbook that examines issues of administrative ethics (Cooper 2000, 2nd ed.), that of a handbook on the ethics 
of economics (Wilber 1997), that of a handbook of policy evaluation (Nagel 2002), that of a more general 
companion looking at global policy issues (Lawton, Van Der Wal, Huberts 2015,), and, finally, that of a 
collective publication that adopts a general philosophical approach to public policy (Gehring & Galston 2002). 
There is also a series of publications that focuses on the morality of particular public policy areas. These 
include: Aaron, Mann, Taylor (1994); Preston & Sampford (2012); Little (2004); Kahn & Kasachkoff (2002); 
Bluhm & Heineman (2007); Stewart (2009); Boston, Bradstock, Eng (2011); Bradstock, Eng, Boston (2011); 
Wolff (2011); Weber (2011); Cohen (2014); Searing & Searing (2016). This indicates that public policy ethics is 
thriving, but in a state of disciplinary fragmentation that we wish to alleviate in and through this handbook. 
7  An abridged version of Williams’ report on Obscenity and Film Censorship is available at 
https://assets.cambridge.org/97811071/13770/frontmatter/9781107113770_frontmatter.pdf; a link to Mary 
Warnock’s 1978 report on special educational needs can be found here: 
http://www.educationengland.org.uk/documents/warnock/, and the link to Warnock's 1984 Report on Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology is available here https://embryo.asu.edu/pages/report-committee-inquiry-human-
fertilisation-and-embryology-1984-mary-warnock-and-committee;  The 2007 Bouchard-Taylor report on 
‘reasonable accommodation’ can be found at https://www.mce.gouv.qc.ca/publications/CCPARDC/rapport-
final-integral-en.pdf; the Report of the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi Commission on the Measurement of Economic 
Performance and Social Progress is available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/118025/118123/Fitoussi+Commission+report  
8 See, in particular, MacKinnon (1997); Minow (1990); Roberts (1997; 2002), and Tremain (1999). 
9 See Thompson (1987), Palumbo & Bellamy (2010), Wolff (2011). 
10 Rorty initially uses the phrase to deflate thick conceptions of objectivity and science, but he later extends it to 
(liberal) moral and political normativity as well. See Rorty (1991: 101). This comes close, but differs from, 
Bernard Williams' contention that liberalism is the way we make sense of political legitimacy "now and around 
here", in Williams (2005: 7-12).  
11 Democratic legitimacy is defeasible in that there may be forms of undemocratic government which are 
properly considered legitimate. On this issue, see Rawls (2001b); Cohen (2009: 349-372), Miller (2015: 177-
192). Moreover, democratic governments may lose their legitimacy through such grave violations of human 
rights that citizens are released from their duty to obey. So even if it is reasonable to grant democracies a 
presumptive legitimacy that other forms of government lack, being democratic is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for legitimacy.  
12 In this respect, we find ourselves concurring with democratic approaches to public policy analysis, like the 
one formulated by Schneider & Ingram (1997), who describe policies that fail to involve ordinary citizens as 
degenerative processes.  
13 Dworkin (1977).  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                     
14 Rawls (1971; 2001a). 
15 Thus, Christopher Kutz points to democracy working as a side-constraint on warfare, while Michael Blake 
focuses on equality and toleration as values that should be promoted via foreign policy. 
16 See, in particular, List (2011). 
17 On definitions of public policy, see, most notably, Dye (1972), and, for a useful recent discussion, Howlett & 
Cashore (2014). 
18 We would like to thank Toon Kerkhoff, Frits van der Meer, Natascha van der Zwan, Alexandre Afonso, and 
Elena Bondarouk for useful discussions on this quasi-historical ordering. 
19 Another advantage of this normatively non-committal ordering is that it lends itself to multiple scholarly 
interpretations. For instance, one could read it as deploying a narrative about the metamorphosis of the state’s 
scope of action and intervention, moving from a watchman state (Section 1) to a welfare state (Section 2) to an 
enabling state (parts of Section 2 and Section 3). Alternatively, for those who might choose to assess the 
morality of public policy on the basis of human rights standard, one could draw a rough parallel between our 
three sections and Karel Vasak’s (1977) famous division of human rights into three generations (civil and 
political, social and economic, and developmental human rights) or connect our ordering to the lively debates 
prompted by T.H. Marshall (1949/1950) about the state’s evolving responsibilities toward its citizens.  
